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There has been much debate in the secondary literature about the 
extent and nature of skepticism in the Enlightenment.1 However, 
there is general agreement that at least two philosophers identified 
with the Enlightenment were skeptics—namely Pierre Bayle and 
David Hume. Both explicitly espoused skepticism and both were 
regarded as skeptics by their contemporaries and critics. Hence it 
seems reasonable to begin any investigation concerning the nature of 
skepticism during the Enlightenment by examining the philosophies 
of these two writers. While Bayle’s views are sometimes identified as 
“pre-Enlightenment,” many discussions of skepticism throughout the 
eighteenth century, including that of Diderot in the Encyclopédie, were 
based on his writings—particularly the Dictionnaire historique et critique. 
Hume is commonly identified as the paradigm of a skeptic during the 
Enlightenment. The skepticism that he espouses is identified by him as 
a “mitigated scepticism, or ACADEMICAL philosophy.”2 However, 
scholars dispute which, if any, of the different forms of ancient 
I am indebted to the editors of this volume, the members of the Ann Arbor Bayle 
Study Group, Tom Lennon, and Kristen Irwin for comments on the chapter at 
different stages of writing. The views expressed are, of course, entirely my own. 
1.  See, for example, articles in Scepticism in the Enlightenment, ed. Richard H. Popkin, 
Ezequiel de Olaso, and Giorgio Tonelli (Dordrecht, 1997); Scepticism in the 
eighteenth century: Enlightenment, Lumières, Aufklärung, ed. Sébastien Charles and 
Plínio Junqueira Smith (Dordrecht, 2013); Anton M. Matytsin, The Specter of 
skepticism in the age of Enlightenment (Baltimore, MD, 2016); Academic scepticism in 
the development of early modern philosophy, ed. Plínio Junqueira Smith and Sébastien 
Charles (Dordrecht, 2017).
2. David Hume, An Enquiry concerning human understanding: a critical edition, ed. 
T. L. Beauchamp (Oxford, 2000), sec.12, para.1, p.112. Subsequent references 
to the Enquiry give section, paragraph, and page numbers.
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Academic skepticism he adopted.3 The form of skepticism adopted by 
Bayle is perhaps less explicit, although recent scholars agree that he 
also was an Academic skeptic.4
In this chapter, I focus on a skeptical theme that I believe to be 
central to the writings of both Bayle and Hume, though it has received 
little attention in the secondary literature, namely the incomprehen-
sibility of reality, or what the ancients called acatalepsia.5 As we shall 
see, in a variety of articles of his Dictionary, Bayle identifies skepticism, 
particularly Academic skepticism, as the thesis that reality is incompre-
hensible. A central focus of his discussions of religion is the claim that 
the fundamental principles of Christianity are incomprehensible to us. 
3. See, in particular, Julia Annas, “Hume and ancient scepticism,” Acta philosophica 
Fennica 66 (2000), p.271–85, who argues that “Hume’s characterizations of both 
Pyrrhonian and Academic Scepticism […] are wrong”: Hume was wrong in 
claiming that Pyrrhonism was incompatible with action and that Academic 
skepticism is less extreme than Pyrrhonism. She does, however, acknowledge 
that Hume may have taken his notions of these forms of skepticism from Cicero 
(p.278–79). Popkin identified both Hume and Bayle as Pyrrhonian skeptics in 
various articles printed in Richard H. Popkin, The High road to Pyrrhonism, ed. 
Richard A. Watson and James E. Force (San Diego, CA, 1980). I challenged 
Popkin’s reading of Hume in my “Hume’s Academic scepticism: a reappraisal of 
his philosophy of human understanding,” Canadian journal of philosophy 16 (1986), 
p.407–36 (410–11, 416).
4. Michael W. Hickson, “Disagreement and Academic scepticism in Bayle,” in 
Academic scepticism in the development of early modern philosophy, ed. P. J. Smith 
and S. Charles, p.293–317; José Raimundo Maia Neto, “Bayle’s Academic 
scepticism,” in Everything connects: in conference with Richard Popkin—essays in his 
honor, ed. James E. Force and David S. Katz (Leiden, 1999), p.363–76; Thomas 
M. Lennon, “What kind of sceptic was Bayle?,” Midwest studies in philosophy 26 
(2002), p.258–79. The stress in these writings is on Bayle’s adoption of academic 
integrity—his determination to consider any argument in the light in which it 
presently appears to him and to allow that further argument may change his 
view. Hume adopts a similar skeptical methodology in A Treatise of human nature, 
eds. David F. Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford, 2007), book 1, part 4, sec.1, 
para.15; ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1978), p.274. 
Subsequent references to the Treatise give book, part, section, and paragraph 
numbers from the Norton edition and the page number from the Selby-Bigge/
Nidditch edition.
5. On the Academic skeptic refutation of the Stoic claim to have cataleptic 
impressions, see Charlotte L. Stough, Greek skepticism (Berkeley, CA, 1969), esp. 
ch.3. For the Renaissance use of the theory of acatalepsia see Silvia Manzo, 
“Reading scepticism historically: scepticism, acatalepsia, and the fall of Adam in 
Francis Bacon,” in Academic scepticism in the development of early modern philosophy, ed. 
P. J. Smith and S. Charles, p.81–102.
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But the claim that the nature of reality is incomprehensible also figures 
prominently in his accounts of purely secular paradoxes such as that 
concerning the nature of extended matter. Hume explicitly holds that 
the power or force by which any object causes another is incompre-
hensible to us. Moreover, he employs a number of closely related terms 
including inconceivability, unintelligibility, absurdity, and impossibility, 
to characterize other beliefs of both common sense and science.
At the same time as they maintained the incomprehensibility of 
reality, both authors argued that one cannot live without belief. Hume 
wrote that “No man ever met with any absurd creature, or conversed 
with a man, who had no opinion or principle concerning any subject, 
either of action or speculation.”6 He argued that doubt concerning 
foundational beliefs, such as those in an external world independent of 
our senses and the efficacy of causes, was impossible except perhaps for 
a brief period when one reflects on their incomprehensibility. Hume 
maintained that “Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity 
has determin’d us to judge as well as to breathe and feel.”7 While 
there is a continuing dispute among interpreters of Bayle regarding 
the sincerity of his commitment to fideism—that is, the belief in 
the fundamental dogmas of religion even in the face of arguments 
showing their irrationality—there is no reason to think that he 
recommended pervasive doubt. Like Hume, he held that people would 
continue to believe in the face of skeptical arguments. He wrote that 
“the grace of God among the faithful, the force of education in other 
men, and even, if you will, ignorance and the natural propensity men 
have to be decisive, are an impenetrable shield against the shafts of 
the Pyrrhonians.”8 While, like the ancient skeptics (Pyrrhonian and 
Academic), both Hume and Bayle argued for the incomprehensibility 
of many of our foundational beliefs, at the same time, they denied 
the possibility of suspending those beliefs, a practice that the ancients 
called the epochē.
Ancient skepticism has been described as involving both a 
thesis and a recommendation.9 The thesis is about knowledge; the 
6. Hume, Enquiry 12.1, p.112.
7. Hume, Treatise 1.4.1.7, p.183.
8. Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique par Mr. Pierre Bayle, ed. Pierre Des 
Maizeaux, 4th ed., 4 vols. (Amsterdam, Brunel, 1730), art. “Pyrrhon,” rem. B, 
vol.3, p.732a.
9. Giselda Striker, “Sceptical strategies,” in Doubt and dogmatism: studies in Hellenistic 
epistemolog y, ed. Malcolm Schofield, Myles F. Burnyeat, and Jonathan Barnes 
(Oxford, 1980), p.54–83.
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 recommendation about belief. The thesis involves the denial that we 
can know or comprehend reality; the recommendation is that we 
should withhold belief on that basis. Enlightenment skepticism, at least 
as practiced by Bayle and Hume, accepts the thesis of the incompre-
hensibility of many of our beliefs regarding the nature of reality while 
denying the possibility of withholding those beliefs.
There is good reason to consider the Academic skepticism adopted 
by both Bayle and Hume as Ciceronian.10 In his article on “Cicero: 
Academic skepticism” in The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, Harold 
Thorsrud stresses the difference between the later Academic skepticism 
of the school of Philo, which Cicero adopted, and the more ancient 
Academic skepticism espoused by Arcesilaus and Carneades of the 
second and third Academies.11 While insisting on universal doubt, 
Carneades had answered the charge of the Stoics that doubt would 
lead to inaction by arguing that the skeptic could continue to live by 
following pithanon, a Greek term which Cicero translated as probilitas.12 
But in adopting this term, Cicero gave it a more robust meaning than 
the original of Carneades which he translated. Thorsrud writes that 
Cicero “frequently uses probabile and veri simile interchangeably”—
indicating “that probabilitas is somehow like the truth.” At the same 
time as he stressed their incomprehensibility, Cicero argued that 
probable beliefs are likely to be true: The “wise man follows many 
things probable [probabilia], that he has not grasped [non comprehensa], 
nor perceived nor assented to but that possess verisimilitude [semilia 
veri].”13 Cicero held that probability for the Academics is not only 
useful “in the conduct of life” but also “in philosophical [i.e., scientific] 
investigation and discussion.”14
10. On the importance of Ciceronian skepticism in the early modern period, see 
in particular Charles B. Schmitt, Cicero scepticus: a study of the influence of the 
“Academica” in the Renaissance (The Hague, 1972).
11. Harold Thorsrud, “Cicero: Academic skepticism,” in The Internet encyclopedia of 
philosophy, esp. sec.4, http://www.iep.utm.edu/cicero-a/ (last accessed August 
23, 2018).
12. On the history of this dispute in the ancient world see Myles F. Burnyeat, 
“Can the sceptic live his scepticism?,” in Doubt and dogmatism, ed. M. Schofield, 
M. F. Burnyeat, and J. Barnes, p.20–53, reprinted in The Skeptical tradition, ed. 
Myles F. Burnyeat (Berkeley, CA, 1983), p.117–48.
13. Cicero, Academica, translated by Harris Rackham, in Opera, 28 vols. (Cambridge, 
MA, 1933), vol.19, p.594–95. Compare p.620–21: “Suppose that these facts of 
yours are true (for you see now that I do admit the existence of some truth) 
nevertheless I deny that they are “grasped” [comprehendi] and perceived [percipi].”
14. Cicero, Academica, p.509.
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As Hume was leaving France in August of 1737 after completing 
a draft of the first two books of his Treatise of human nature, he wrote 
to a friend back in England to recommend four books to help 
him understand “the metaphysical Parts of [his] reasoning.” These 
books included Bayle’s Dictionary—in particular “some of the more 
metaphysical Articles … such as those [… of ] Zeno & Spinoza.”15 
While Hume only refers once to Bayle in his Treatise (only five times in 
all his published works), the influence of Bayle throughout his writings 
on metaphysics and epistemology is well established.16 However, the 
nature of that influence has been disputed. Todd Ryan has argued 
that “Hume was not a sceptic in the Baylean mold… Hume clearly 
and deliberately rejects the kind of logical conflict among principles 
of reason upon which Bayle builds his own skepticism.”17 Ryan stops 
short of defining the kind of skepticism employed by Hume, noting 
only that there is a well-recognized tension between his skepticism 
and his aim to found a new science of human nature. My aim in the 
present chapter is to argue for the basic similarity of the skepticism 
adopted by the two philosophers based on their claims concerning 
the incomprehensibility of many of our beliefs—including that of 
extension as discussed in Bayle’s article on Zeno, and that of the 
immateriality of the soul, where Hume adapts an argument from 
Bayle’s article on Spinoza. Moreover, I argue that even in Hume’s 
naturalistic explanations there exist logical oppositions of the basic 
principles of the mind—including those based on reason.
In section i, I document Bayle’s stress on incomprehensibility in his 
characterization of skepticism in a number of articles of the Dictionary. 
In section ii, I argue that Hume holds, like Bayle, that there are 
rational arguments on both sides of the issue of the immateriality 
of the soul, leaving us with the conclusion that both materialism 
15. The other books were Nicholas Malebranche’s De la recherche de la vérité, Berkeley’s 
Principles of human knowledge, and Descartes’s Meditations. This letter was reported 
in Tadeusz Kozanecki, “Dawida Hume’a Nieznane Listy W Zbiorach Muzeum 
Czartoryskich (Polska),” Archiwum historii filozofii spolecznej 9 (1963), p.127–41. I 
discussed Hume’s use of Malebranche’s Recherche in my Sceptical realism of David 
Hume (Manchester, 1983).
16. In fact, this was clearly established before the discovery of this letter. See, in 
particular, Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London, 1940), 
p.325 and passim. See also his edition of David Hume, Dialogues concerning natural 
religion (London, 1947).
17. Todd Ryan, “Hume’s reply to Baylean scepticism,” in Scepticism in the eighteenth 
century, ed. S. Charles and P. J. Smith, p.125–37.
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and immaterialism are incomprehensible. I explain Hume’s use of 
Bayle’s article on Spinoza in developing the arguments against an 
immaterial soul. In section iii, I interpret Hume’s discussion of space 
in his Treatise, where he ostensibly argues against Bayle’s claim that 
extension is incomprehensible. I argue that in spite of his attempt in 
his Treatise to insist that we have a clear and distinct idea of minimal 
parts of extension, Hume distances himself from that critique in his 
later Enquiry concerning human understanding. Moreover, Hume follows 
Bayle’s skepticism closely in denying the conceivability of a vacuum 
or absolute space, and yet acknowledges that both nonphilosophers 
and Newtonians have this belief. I show how Hume argues that the 
belief in a vacuum is based on a “fiction” of the imagination that 
confuses opposing ideas of distance. A similar kind of confusion of 
ideas is also the basis for Hume’s account of the belief in an external 
world independent of our senses, which I consider in section iv. I 
contrast the phenomenalism of Berkeley, which denies the possible 
existence of an external world, with the skepticism of Hume, who, 
while agreeing that this belief is incoherent when subjected to 
philosophical analysis, argues that we cannot help but accept it. 
In section v, I consider Hume’s account of causal power: While he 
claims that it is incomprehensible, he accounts for our belief in it on 
the basis of the operation of constant experience on the principles of 
the imagination. I also return to his discussion of the immateriality 
of the soul and explain his claim that experience of cause and effect 
favors materialism in spite of its incomprehensibility. Finally, in 
section vi, I discuss the way comprehensibility and incomprehensi-
bility figure in each philosopher’s discussion of the argument from 
design. In rejecting comprehensibility as the basis for ascribing causal 
power, Hume refutes Bayle’s claim that order can only be explained 
by a divine mind which comprehends the order and the means by 
which it is produced.
i. Pierre Bayle on skepticism and incomprehensibility
Pierre Bayle begins his famous article on Pyrrho in the Dictionary 
by noting that both Pyrrhonian and Academic skeptics taught 
“the incomprehensibility of all things.”18 He modifies this claim 
in remark A, where he draws a distinction between the views of 
these two schools of ancient skepticism: A Pyrrhonian “does not 
18. Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. “Pyrrhon,” vol.4, p.731–32.
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formally adopt incomprehensibility”; he only claims that everything 
he has yet investigated has been found to be incomprehensible. It was 
Arcesilaus—the founder of the second Academy—who unequivocally 
adopted the doctrine that “the nature of things is incomprehensible.” 
In his article “Arcesilas,” Bayle reaffirmed that “it was he, who taught 
the Acatalepsia, or the incomprehensibility of things, more explicitly 
than was ever done before.”19 In this respect, Arcesilaus was more 
dogmatic than the Pyrrhonians. He was followed in this by Carneades 
of the third Academy: “Carneades, who was able to support it better 
than he, was obliged to have recourse to some modification.” In his 
article “Carneade,” Bayle repeats the claim regarding Carneades’s 
commitment to incomprehensibility: “with regard to incomprehensi-
bility he carried things as far as the other.”20 Carneades’s modification 
was only that “he did not deny, with Arcesilaus, that there were 
no truths.” The ancient philosopher allowed that probability was 
sufficient to determine one’s actions “provided one makes no absolute 
pronouncements on anything.”21 Nevertheless, citing Cicero’s Academica, 
Bayle notes that the probable truths which Carneades allowed 
for were incomprehensible. Bayle notes that Carneades was even 
committed to the paradoxical conclusion that “this very Proposition, 
that there is nothing certain, we can comprehend nothing, is uncertain and 
incomprehensible.”22
In spite of the differences described in remark A of his article 
on Pyrrho, Bayle often treats Pyrrhonians and Academics in the 
Dictionary more or less interchangeably. He claims that most modern 
natural philosophers are “Academics and Pyrrhonists” insofar as they 
consider nature as “an impenetrable abyss,” the springs of which are 
hidden to all but their maker.23 But in a number of articles of the 
Dictionary, Bayle goes further in describing beliefs, including not only 
the “mysteries” of Christianity but also the foundational beliefs of 
science, as unintelligible or incomprehensible in the sense that they are 
in direct conflict with reason. To use theological language, they are 
not just above reason, but contrary to reason. Among the latter are the 
belief in the so-called mysteries of Christianity, the belief in motion, 
and the Newtonian belief in absolute space.
19. Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. “Arcesilas,” rem. E, vol.1, p.286a.
20. Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. “Carneade,” rem. B, vol.2, p.58a–59a (58a).
21. Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. “Carneade,” rem. B, vol.2, p.58b.
22. Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. “Carneade,” rem. B, vol.2, p.58a.
23. Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. “Pyrrhon,” rem. B, vol.3, p.732a.
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In his article on the fifth-century-bc philosopher Xenophanes, 
Bayle speculates that both Academic and Pyrrhonian skepticism 
had their roots in the claim of Xenophanes and Parmenides that the 
universe is one and unchanging. He writes that the origin of “the sect 
of the Acataleptics (that is those who taught the incomprehensibility of 
things) and that of the Pyrrhonians owed their birth to the principle 
of the immutable unity of all things supported by Xenophanes.”24 
By “the sect of the Acataleptics” here he is apparently referring to 
Academic philosophers. Bayle offers a reconstruction of Xenophanes’s 
reasoning beginning with the maxim that something cannot arise from 
nothing and concluding with the claim that whatever exists has always 
existed and is both immovable and immutable. Having drawn such a 
conclusion from reason, Parmenides had concluded that the changes 
we believe ourselves to experience “are only illusions of our senses, and 
pure appearances.”25 However, Bayle argues that Xenophanes himself 
came to acknowledge that the senses give evidence that there is actual 
change in the universe. Bayle writes that, given this recognition, “I 
do not see that he could make any other reply than this: our reason 
is as fallacious as our senses, and everything is incomprehensible 
to reason.”26 According to Bayle’s reconstruction, these conflicting 
sources of evidence would have convinced Xenophanes that “the 
truth is something incomprehensible and impenetrable.” Bayle notes 
that, while Sextus Empiricus had hesitated in including Xenophanes 
among the Acataleptics, he “nevertheless ascribes to him the opinion 
that we never comprehend things to that degree of certainty that 
constitutes science, and that one only attains judgments of likelihood 
and probability.” And Bayle asks: “Is this not at bottom to support 
Acatalepsia or the incomprehensibility of things?”27 We find here the 
same connection between probability and incomprehensibility that 
Bayle, following Cicero, notes in the article on Carneades.
In his article on “Zenon d’Elée,” Bayle goes further and puts 
forward arguments for the nonexistence of extension based on the 
inconceivability of its composition: “Here is what Zeno could have 
said. Extension cannot be composed either of mathematical points, or 
atoms, or parts divisible to infinity: therefore, its existence is impossible. 
24. Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. “Xenophanes,” rem. L, vol.4, p.523b. The parenthetical 
remark is added in the margin.
25. Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. “Xenophanes,” rem. A, vol.4, p.516a.
26. Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. “Xenophanes,” rem. L, vol.4, p.523b.
27. Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. “Xenophanes,” rem. L, vol.4, p.524a.
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The consequence seems certain, since one is only able to conceive of 
these three ways of composition of extension.”28 He goes on to argue 
for the inconceivability of each of these three alternatives—which he 
claims are exhaustive. He argues first that it is “impossible, or at least 
inconceivable” that extended matter could consist of mathematical 
points because, in having zero extension, they could never be put 
together to compose anything extended. Similarly, he argues that “it 
is no less impossible or inconceivable that it is composed of Epicurean 
atoms, that is of extended and indivisible corpuscules.” They must 
have a right and left side, a top and bottom and so be divisible, and 
hence be made up of distinct bodies. Finally, he constructs a number 
of arguments against the conceivability of extension being infinitely 
divisible, as Aristotle and the scholastics had claimed. He reasons, 
for example, that if an extended body were infinitely divisible “the 
immediate contact of two parts is impossible.”29 Further, the same 
geometrical arguments that are used to argue against finite parts of 
extension can also be used to show the impossibility of infinite divisi-
bility.30 He concludes that, just as mathematicians make the claim that 
mathematical points, lines, and two-dimensional figures can only exist 
“in our mind” or “ideally,” the same is true of the three-dimensional 
figures which constitute physical matter.31
In remark I of the article on Zeno of Elea, Bayle brings the 
theory of incomprehensibility into the realm of modern science. He 
writes that, even though Newtonian science does not support Zeno’s 
arguments against the possibility of motion, nevertheless it supports 
the Eleatic “Hypothese de l’Acatalepsie, ou de l’incompréhensibilité de 
toutes choses.”32 He argues that the Newtonian belief in absolute space 
or a vacuum is directly contrary to the clearest idea of the human 
mind—that of extension. The modern mathematicians “demonstrate 
the existence of some-thing which is contrary to the existence of the 
28. Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. “Zenon de Elée,” rem. G, vol.4, p.540a.
29. Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. “Zenon de Elée,” rem. G, vol.4, p.540b.
30. Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. “Zenon de Elée,” rem. G, vol.4, p.541b.
31. As Todd Ryan has pointed out, Bayle appears at one point to interpret this claim 
as referring to our visual perceptions—which is important in considering how 
Hume takes up and critiques these claims in his Treatise; Todd Ryan, “Hume’s 
reply to Baylean scepticism,” p.128–29. See below, section iii. Ryan also calls 
our attention to Bayle’s continuation of this discussion in the following article on 
“Zenon, philosophe épicurien” where he “draws attention not to visual percepts, 
but to our concept of extension.”
32. Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. “Zenon d’Elée,” rem. I, vol.4, p.545a.
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most evident notions of our understanding; for if there is any nature 
whose essential properties we evidently know, it is extension. We have 
a clear and distinct idea of it.”33 The essential properties of this clear 
and distinct idea of extension are “divisibility, mobility, and impene-
trability.” But the empty space which the Newtonians demonstrate in 
order to explain the motion of the planets is essentially “immobile, 
indivisible, and penetrable.” We are therefore forced to admit the 
existence of a nature of which we have no idea, and which opposes the 
clearest idea that we have. Nevertheless, this is the notion that accords 
with common sense: “I know with regard to ordinary people, it is 
almost as strange a paradox to deny a vacuum, as to deny movement.” 
Bayle went on to list a number of scientific problems with the notion of 
a vacuum, as well as the Cartesian idea of a plenum. Since there are 
paradoxes connected with both theories, modern physicists are forced 
to choose “between two incomprehensible systems.”34 Whether one 
adopts the Newtonian theory of absolute space or the Cartesian theory 
of a plenum, one adopts a belief that has irresolvable difficulties.
Throughout the Dictionary, Bayle argues that most Christian 
theologians, whether Roman Catholic or Protestant, are forced to 
acknowledge that the mysteries of religion are incomprehensible. In 
his Second Clarification, Bayle writes that a Christian must believe 
revealed mysteries “however inconceivable they are, and however 
impossible they appear to our reason.”35 He says that he is willing to 
limit himself to the opinion of most theologians that “the mysteries of 
the Gospel” such as the Trinity and the hypostatic union (the claim 
that Christ is both man and God) are “above reason”; however, his 
actual treatment of these mysteries indicates that he considers them to 
be “against reason.”36 Consider the arguments Bayle puts in the words 
of the philosophical abbé in remark B of the article on Pyrrho. The abbé 
claims that there is a direct conflict between reason and the mysteries 
that a Christian must accept through revelation. For example, “it is 
evident that things that do not differ from a third are not different 
from each other: this is the basis of all our reasonings … and, 
nevertheless, the revelation of the mystery of the Trinity convinces us 
that this axiom is false.”37 This fundamental rule of reason is directly 
33. Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. “Zenon d’Elée,” rem. I, vol.4, p.544a.
34. Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. “Zenon d’Elée,” rem. I, vol.4, p.545a.
35. Bayle, Dictionnaire, éclaircissement II, vol.4, p.622.
36. Bayle, Dictionnaire, éclaircissement II, vol.4, p.620.
37. Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. “Pyrrhon,” rem. B, vol.3, p.732b.
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contrary to the Christian doctrine that there is a being that is three 
persons and only one substance. Similarly, the Catholic doctrine of 
transubstantiation violates the rule of reason that a body cannot be 
in two distinct places at the same time. Such doctrines are incompre-
hensible, because they are directly contrary to basic principles of 
reason. The examples can be multiplied.
The mystery of religion which most preoccupies Bayle throughout 
the Dictionary—and went on to preoccupy his Enlightenment 
successors—concerns the question of the origin of evil. Bayle holds 
that the Calvinist doctrine of original sin, which requires “the eternal 
damnation of an infinite number of people who cannot be saved 
without an efficacious grace which God only gives to his elect” is of 
all the mysteries of Christianity that which is the most “inconceivable 
to our reason, and inexplicable according to its maxims.”38 In support, 
he directly appeals to scripture, noting that at the same time as this 
doctrine was espoused by St. Paul, he acknowledged its incompre-
hensibility: “The writings of St. Paul teach us that this great apostle, 
having proposed to himself the difficulties of predestination, could get 
out of it only by asserting God’s absolute right over his creatures, with 
an exclamation on the incomprehensibility of His ways.”39 Unlike the 
various mysteries mentioned in the previous paragraph, the incompre-
hensibility of this doctrine is not based simply on the writings of 
philosophers; it occurs to ordinary people who understand and act on 
moral principles of justice throughout their lives. These are principles 
“which everyone knows, and which constantly regulate the actions of 
both the learned and the ignorant in determining whether an action is 
unjust or not.”40 Bayle notes that the attempt of theologians to justify 
predestination by appeal to God’s infinity, and the claim that God 
38. Bayle, Dictionnaire, éclaircissement II, vol.4, p.625.
39. Bayle, Dictionnaire, éclaircissement II, vol.4, p.625. Bayle cites Romans 9.18–20 
in remark E of his article on Arminius, stressing again that St. Paul, “who was 
inspired by God, and immediately directed by the Holy Spirit in everything he 
wrote, proposed to himself the objection to the doctrine of absolute predestination 
that is formed by the natural light” (Bayle, Dictionnaire, vol.1, p.334b–335a). By 
“the natural light” he is, of course, referring to reason.
40. Bayle, Dictionnaire, éclaircissement II, vol.4, p.625. Bayle’s commitment to an 
objective reason-based morality is also clear from works such as his Pensées 
diverses sur la comète of 1683, his Commentaire philosophique of 1686, and his Contin-
uation des Pensées diverses of 1704. See Kristen Irwin, “The implication of Bayle’s 
qualified Academic scepticism for moral knowledge,” in Academic scepticism in the 
development of early modern philosophy, ed. P. J. Smith and S. Charles, p.275–92.
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is not subject to human notions of justice, only raises a new set of 
objections that further reveal the incomprehensibility of evil. Predes-
tination, however incomprehensible, must simply be believed on the 
basis of the authority of scripture.
At the same time, we need to recognize that Bayle holds that not 
only morality, but also our belief in the existence of the creator, is 
based on reason: “The most certain and clear ideas of order teach 
us that a being which is self-existent, necessary, and eternal must be 
unique, infinite, all powerful, and endowed with all sorts of perfections 
[infini, tout-puissant, & doué de toutes sortes de perfections].”41 He 
says that the arguments for the existence of such a being are based on 
reason and include the appeal to the simplest hypothesis to account 
for the facts of nature and the regularity of the laws of motion. But, 
while the belief in the existence of a perfect creator is based on a 
priori reason, it conflicts with the rational acknowledgment based on 
experience that there is natural and moral evil in the creation.
There is, as I mentioned earlier, continuing controversy among 
Bayle scholars as to whether we must take his affirmations of faith 
in the mysteries of Christianity as sincere.42 But without facing this 
irresolvable problem, we can certainly affirm that he holds that 
religious people actually believe what is incomprehensible. Moreover, 
as Bayle makes clear in articles such as those of “Pyrrho” and “Zeno,” 
such incomprehensible beliefs are not limited to religion; they are to 
be found in modern science and even in common sense.
ii. Hume on the immateriality of the soul  
and his use of Bayle’s article “Spinoza”
Scholars have argued that in Hume’s philosophy, unlike that of Bayle, 
“reason cannot be in conflict with itself.”43 However, such a conflict 
is clearly to be found in Hume’s discussion “Of the immateriality of 
the soul” in his Treatise of human nature, where he sets up an antinomy 
41. Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. “Manichéens,” rem. B, vol.3, p.305a.
42. Elisabeth Labrousse argued forcefully for Bayle’s fideism in her Pierre Bayle, 
vol.2: Hétérodoxie et rigorisme (The Hague, 1964), as well as many articles. See 
also Elisabeth Labrousse, Bayle, translated by Denys Potts (Oxford, 1983). 
Perhaps the strongest opposing view is that put forward by Gianluca Mori, Bayle 
philosophe (Paris, 1999).
43. Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, p.285; Ryan, “Hume’s reply to 
Baylean scepticism.”
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of reason.44 First, he presents an argument that leads to the conclusion 
that most of our thoughts cannot be located in an extended object 
like our brains (Treatise 1.4.5.7–14). Like Bayle, he employs a version of 
what Kant later called the “Achilles of all […] dialectical inferences” 
to argue against the materiality of the soul.45 Hume writes: “Whatever 
is extended consists of parts; and whatever consists of parts is divisible 
[…] But ’tis impossible any thing divisible can be conjoin’d to a thought 
or perception, which is a being altogether inseparable and divisible. 
For supposing such a conjunction, wou’d the indivisible thought exist 
on the left or the right side of this extended divisible body?”46 The 
conclusion is that the soul or mind cannot be composed of extended 
divisible matter. Then, Hume turns around and adapts an argument 
that Bayle had presented against the coherence of Spinozism, in order 
to show the incomprehensibility of the view that our extended thoughts 
or perceptions can be conjoined with a simple immaterial soul (Treatise 
1.4.5.15–25). The conclusion of this argument is that the soul or mind 
cannot be immaterial and unextended. Finally, without resolving 
these opposing rational arguments, Hume argues on the basis of 
experience that changes in our bodies can, and often do, cause changes 
in our mental state (Treatise 1.4.5.29–32), and he concludes that this 
fact supports materialism.47
In Hume’s first argument against materialism, he maintains that most 
of our perceptions are unextended, and, therefore, cannot be located in 
a material object such as our brains. These perceptions include not only 
44. My overall interpretation of Hume’s strategy in Treatise 1.4.5 differs from that of 
Lorne Falkenstein in “Hume’s reply to the Achilles argument,” in The Achilles of 
rationalist psycholog y, ed. Thomas M. Lennon and Robert J. Stainton (Dordrecht, 
2008), p.193–214. Falkenstein regards the whole argument as a refutation of 
immaterialism, including an “immaterialism that takes the soul to be extended 
but incomposite” (p.204). I find no evidence for this latter claim in Hume’s text. 
On my interpretation, Hume shows the incomprehensibility of both materialism 
and immaterialism, and then provides a naturalistic explanation which favors 
materialism. For Hume’s naturalist solution, see section v below.
45. See Pierre Bayle, Réponses aux questions d’un provincial, in Œuvres diverses, 4 
vols. (The Hague, Compagnie des libraires, 1737), vol.3, p.904b. For Kant’s 
argument, see Immanuel Kant, The Critique of pure reason, translated by Paul 
Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge, 1998), A351, p.417. For a history of this 
argument, see Ben Mijuskovic, The Achilles of rationalist arguments: the simplicity, 
unity, and identity of thought and soul from the Cambridge Platonists to Kant (The Hague, 
1974), and Lennon and Stainton, The Achilles of rationalist psycholog y.
46. Hume, Treatise 1.4.5.7, p.234.
47. See the end of section v below for this final part of the argument.
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our passions and affections, but also objects of our senses, such as smells 
and tastes. Such perceptions and their objects cannot exist in any place. 
Hume argues that we only believe that the smell and taste of any fruit, 
say an orange, are located in the orange because of an association of 
ideas that arises as a result of experiencing them together. It is only our 
imagination or “our fancy by which we are determin’d to incorporate 
the taste with the extended object.”48 However, “our reason […] shows 
us the impossibility of such an union.” Indeed, there is, he writes, “in 
this union something altogether unintelligible and contradictory.” If it 
is claimed that the taste or smell exists in every part of the extended 
object, this is “absurd and incomprehensible” because we then must hold 
that the taste or smell has a shape and extension.49 Similarly, it is 
incomprehensible that an unextended thought such as a passion can be 
located in a material object such as the brain:
If it exist within its dimensions, it must either exist in one particular 
part, and then that particular part is indivisible, and the perception 
is joined only with it, not the extension; or if the thought exists in 
every part, it must be extended, and separable, and divisible, as well 
as the body; which is utterly absurd and contradictory. For can any 
one conceive of a passion of a yard in length, a foot in breadth, and 
an inch in thickness?50
The conclusion of the argument is that our thoughts—at least, those 
which like our passions are unextended—cannot be located in our 
extended bodies.
Hume goes on to balance this argument against one showing the 
incomprehensibility of the immaterialist conception of the soul: “Tho’ 
in this view of things we cannot refuse to condemn the materialists 
who conjoin all thought with extension; yet a little reflection will 
show us equal reason for blaming their antagonists, who conjoin all 
thought with a simple and immaterial substance.”51 He argues that 
our perceptions of sight and touch (unlike smells, tastes, and passions) 
48. Hume, Treatise 1.4.5.13, p.238.
49. Emphasis added.
50. Hume, Treatise 1.4.5.7, p.234–35.
51. Hume, Treatise 1.4.5.15, p.239. It is striking that while at the beginning of 
the section (Treatise 1.4.5.2–6) Hume argued that the question of whether our 
perceptions inhere in a material or immaterial substance is unintelligible because 
we have no idea of a substance distinct from individual perceptions, he now 
allows that we do have such an idea when he argues against the immateriality 
of the soul. He makes this explicit at Treatise 1.4.5.17, p.240.
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are themselves extended, and that it is impossible that they can exist 
in an unextended and simple soul. How is it possible to “incorporate 
a simple and indivisible subject with an extended perception? […] Is 
the indivisible subject, or immaterial substance […] on the left or on 
the right hand of the perception? Is it in this particular part, or in that 
other? Is it in every part without being extended?”52
Hume then adapts Bayle’s argument against Spinoza’s claim that 
all objects are modifications of one simple and unified substance to 
critique the claim of “the theologians” that all perceptions are modifi-
cations of one simple immaterial soul.53 Just as Bayle had pointed 
out the unintelligibility of Spinoza’s claim that the extended material 
world inheres in a simple unchanging substance that he called God 
or Nature, so Hume argues for the unintelligibility of the view that 
our extended perceptions inhere in a simple, unchanging substance 
called the soul. For example, Bayle had argued that Spinoza’s view 
implied that one and the same substance can have two contradictory 
predicates at one and the same time. On Bayle’s reading of Spinoza’s 
doctrine, what we think of as ordinary material objects, such as 
tables and chairs, are not really substances but mere modifications of 
the one single substance which constitutes the universe. Hence, that 
single substance would be at one and the same time both the square 
table in the corner and the round table beside it.54 But this is absurd, 
since one and the same substance cannot be round and square at 
52. Hume, Treatise 1.4.5.16, p.240.
53. Hume, Treatise 1.4.5.17–25, p.240–44. See Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. “Spinoza,” 
rem. N, vol.4, p.259–62. It should be noted that Hume now returns to the 
question that he condemned as unintelligible at the beginning of the section on 
the grounds that we have no idea of a substance independent of a perception!
54. See Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. “Spinoza,” rem. N, vol.4, p.260a. Compare Hume, 
Treatise 1.4.5.25, p.244. For a comparison of each of Hume’s arguments with 
those of Bayle, see my “Hume, Descartes, and the materiality of the soul,” 
in The Philosophical canon in the 17th and 18th centuries, ed. G. A. J. Rogers and 
Sylvana Tomaselli (Rochester, NY, 1996), p.175–90 (180–83). Hume’s argument 
presupposes that “whatever conclusions […] we form concerning objects, will 
be applicable to impressions” (Treatise 1.4.5.20, p.241). In his Thinking matter: 
materialism in eighteenth-century Britain (Minneapolis, MN, 1983), John W. Yolton 
argued that Hume was satirizing this view, but on my reading this is the 
assumption that Hume needs to draw parallel arguments from Bayle’s critique 
of Spinoza’s conception of the external world to his own critique of “the 
theologians” who believe that all our perceptions are modifications of a single 
unextended immaterial soul. See also Falkenstein, “Hume’s reply to the Achilles 
argument,” who also takes issue with Yolton’s reading of the passage.
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the same time. Similarly, Hume asks how the simultaneous perceptions 
which one has of a round and square table in the corner of a room 
can coexist in a simple soul substance which apprehends them. If our 
extended perceptions of such objects were modifications of a simple 
uncompounded soul, it would follow that this soul would have contra-
dictory predicates at the same time.
Finally, at the end of the Treatise section “Of the immateriality of 
the soul” Hume argues that, in spite of the unintelligibility of both 
materialism and immaterialism, experience shows us that changes in 
our bodies actually cause changes in our thoughts. He concludes that 
experience favors materialism. In order to understand this claim, we 
will first have to consider Hume’s account of the incomprehensibility 
of causal relations, a task I shall take up in section v below.55
iii. Hume’s response to Bayle’s article on Zeno of Elea
The claim that Hume rejects Bayle’s form of skepticism is largely 
based on his discussion of space and time in sections 1–3 of part 2 of 
book 1 of his Treatise of human nature. In these passages, Hume takes 
issue with Bayle’s argument for the incomprehensibility of extension 
in his article on Zeno of Elea.56 As we have seen in section i, Bayle 
had argued that none of the three alternatives for the composition 
of extension—mathematical points, physical points (i.e., atoms), or 
infinitely divisible parts—is possible.57 Hume argues in opposition to 
Bayle that we do have a clear and distinct idea of indivisible minimal 
parts of extension—that is, physical points or atoms. He bases this 
claim, first, on his empiricist principle that all our ideas are derived 
from impressions; second, on his argument from experience that 
our visual impressions reach a threshold below which they instanta-
neously disappear; and third, on what he calls “an established maxim 
of metaphysics, that whatever the mind clearly conceives includes the idea of 
possible existence.”58 Hume concludes that these minimal ideas of the 
parts of extension give us “adequate representations of objects”—a 
55. See below, p.154–56.
56. See Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, p.285–88, and Ryan, “Hume’s 
reply to Baylean scepticism,” p.128–29 and 133–34. On Hume’s use of Bayle’s 
article on Zeno, see also Gianni Paganini, “Hume and Bayle on localization and 
perception: a new source for Hume’s Treatise 1.4.5,” in Scepticism in the eighteenth 
century, ed. S. Charles and P. J. Smith, p.109–24.
57. Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. “Zenon d’Elée,” rem. G, vol.4, p.540–42.
58. Hume, Treatise 1.2.2.8, p.32.
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conclusion directly opposed to that of Bayle.59 While recognizing that 
there are geometrical demonstrations to prove that matter is infinitely 
rather than finitely divisible, Hume argues in his Treatise that they do 
not apply to absolute minima and are “built on ideas which are not 
exact, and maxims which are not precisely true.”60
Nevertheless, in his Enquiry concerning human understanding Hume 
distances himself from his earlier critique of Bayle’s skepticism 
concerning the composition of extension.61 Here, Hume acknowledges 
the strength of the demonstrations of infinite divisibility provided by 
philosophers and geometricians:
Nothing can be more convincing and satisfactory than all the 
conclusions concerning the properties of circles and triangles; and 
yet, when these are once received, how can we deny, that the angle 
of contact between a circle and its tangent is infinitely less than any 
rectilineal angle, that as you increase the diameter of the circle in 
infinitum, this angle of contact becomes still less, even in infinitum.62
He argues that this and other demonstrations of infinite divisibility 
are “as unexceptional” as any others in geometry, and all such 
demonstations are “big with contradiction and absurdity.” It is true 
that in two footnotes he continues to suggest his solution of indivisible 
“physical points” as a way “to avoid these absurdities and contra-
dictions” but only as a “hint […], without pursuing it any further.”63 
Like Bayle, he recognizes that even the clear and distinct ideas of 
geometry prove contradictory when subjected to the caustic acid of 
our skeptical reason. And Hume no longer maintains that knowledge 
of geometry requires that its basic ideas be adequate representations 
of external objects.64
Moreover, when Hume turns to the notion of a vacuum or absolute 
space in sections 4–5 of part 2 of book 1 of his Treatise, he clearly 
follows Bayle’s strategy of arguing for its incomprehensibility. This 
strategy sets the stage for the skepticism he develops on later topics 
in book 1 of the Treatise. Like Bayle, Hume maintains that a vacuum 
59. Hume, Treatise 1.2.2.1, p.29. For Bayle’s claim that extension only exists in the 
mind or ideally, see section i above, p.137.
60. Hume, Treatise 1.2.4.17, p.44–45.
61. This is acknowledged by Ryan, “Hume’s reply to Baylean scepticism,” p.134.
62. Hume, Enquiry 12.18, p.117.
63. Hume, Enquiry 12.18, n.33, p.117, and 12.20, n.34, p.118.
64. Hume, Enquiry 4.1, p.24.
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or absolute space is inconceivable: “’Tis impossible to conceive […] 
a vacuum and extension without matter.”65 Hume initially bases this 
argument on his earlier claim that our idea of space is composed of 
finite indivisible points. However, like Bayle, he acknowledges that the 
contrary belief in empty space or a vacuum accords with common 
sense, and he explains how through a confusion of ideas we come to 
believe in the existence of this “invisible and intangible distance.”66
Hume’s explanation of the common-sense belief in a vacuum or 
absolute space is based on a “fiction” of the imagination caused by 
resemblance. In what he calls “our natural and most familiar way of 
thinking” we tend to confuse “two kinds of distance” and, taking the 
one for the other, come to believe that there is space without matter.67 
The one kind of distance he calls a “fictitious distance” and illustrates 
it through a situation where we look at two objects (for example, 
two stars in the night sky) separated by utter darkness—i.e., by “the 
negation of light, or more properly of speaking, of colour’d and visible 
objects.”68 The perception of distance in this case is absolutely “simple 
and indivisible” and hence “can never give us the idea of [a genuine] 
extension,” which requires multiple parts between the two distant 
objects.69 But the movement of our eyes as we look from one distant 
object to the other is the same as it would be if they were separated 
by a genuine extension filled with visible bodies. It is this and other 
resemblances between these “two kinds of distance” which make us 
confuse the first with the second, leading us to think that we have an 
idea of space without matter.
Hume attributes this confusion to a principle of the imagination 
which becomes key in his later discussions of our judgments of external 
existence, material substance, and personal identity.70 He writes that 
“we may establish it as a general maxim of human nature, that 
whenever there is a close relation betwixt two ideas, the mind is very 
apt to mistake them, and in all its discourses and reasonings to use 
65. Hume, Treatise 1.2.4.2, p.40. Compare Treatise 1.2.5.1, p.54, where he writes that 
“we can form no idea of a vacuum, or space where there is nothing visible or 
tangible.”
66. Hume, Treatise 1.2.5.12, app. p.639.
67. Hume, Treatise 1.2.5.11, p.57, and 1.2.5.17, p.59.
68. Hume, Treatise 1.2.5.23, p.62.
69. Hume, Treatise 1.2.5.12, p.58.
70. This principle is the foundation of what I have called the “identity substitution 
principle” in Hume’s “A Treatise of human nature”: an introduction (Cambridge, 2009), 
ch.4.
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the one for the other.”71 It is association of ideas by way of resemblance 
which is the main cause of the confusion.72 This substitution of the one 
idea for the other takes place unconsciously, and Hume ascribes it to 
the physiology of the brain.73
According to Hume then, the systematic and unconscious 
replacement of the idea of a genuine extension composed of parts 
with the idea of the “fictitious distance” is the source of our belief in 
the existence of absolute space. The result is an opposition between 
the belief based on our clear and distinct impression-derived idea 
of space, on the one hand, and the natural common-sense belief in 
space generated by the substitution of ideas, on the other. Important 
to note in this context is the fact that Hume, like Bayle, does not deny 
that people have a genuine belief in space without body, even though 
he explains that belief by ascribing it to a confusion of ideas. While 
admitting that any attempt to answer the question about the real 
nature of things “will be full of scepticism and uncertainty,” he asserts 
in the appendix that he added to book 3 of the Treatise that he himself 
is inclined to believe that there really is space without matter “as being 
more suitable to vulgar and popular notions.”74 But this concession is 
immediately retracted, and Hume ends up adopting “a fair confession 
of ignorance in subjects, that exceed all human capacity.”
In the first part of this section, I argued that, in spite of Hume’s 
attempt in his early Treatise to refute Bayle’s argument that extension 
cannot exist objectively because the parts that compose it are 
inconceivable, in his later Enquiry concerning human understanding he 
clearly acknowledges the contradictions which result from perfectly 
valid demonstrations of geometry—and, like Bayle, holds that its 
basic principles may only apply to mental objects. Moreover, both 
philosophers acknowledge that the belief in absolute space, while it 
accords with both common sense and Newtonian philosophy, cannot 
be conceived through a clear and distinct idea. Hume explicitly argues 
that the belief in absolute space or a vacuum is based on a confusion of 
two distinct ideas of distance caused by association. The fundamental 
incomprehensibility of the belief is manifest when we examine exactly 
how it is generated. The same is true of Hume’s account of our belief 
in an external world, which I shall examine in the next section.
71. Hume, Treatise 1.2.5.19, p.60; compare 1.4.2.32, p.202.
72. Hume, Treatise 1.2.5.21, p.61.
73. Hume, Treatise 1.2.5.20, p.60–61.
74. Hume, Treatise 1.2.5.26, n.12, p.639.
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iv. Incomprehensibility of belief in an external world:  
transition from Berkeley’s phenomenalism to Hume’s skepticism
In his Enquiry, Hume claims that the writings of George Berkeley 
“form the best lessons of skepticism, which are to be found either 
among ancient or modern writers, BAYLE not excepted.”75 Hume’s 
comment tells us far more about his own conception of skepticism 
than it does about Berkeley’s. For Berkeley set out to defeat skepticism 
by showing that there is no external world apart from appear-
ances.76 He wrote that “scepticism follows […] from our supposing a 
difference between things and ideas, and [supposing] that the former 
have a subsistence without the mind or unperceived.”77 By denying 
such a double existence of appearances and objects and by arguing 
that objects consist of no more than appearances, Berkeley claimed 
to have conquered skepticism. However, Hume regards Berkeley as 
a skeptic malgré lui. He holds that, while Berkeley’s arguments are 
irrefutable, they leave the belief in an external independent world 
intact. They “admit […] of no answer, and produce […] no conviction.”78 For 
Hume, what skepticism teaches us is that we cannot help but believe 
in an external world independent of perceptions even though, like 
Berkeley, he holds that this belief is incomprehensible.
Berkeley had argued that, since it was impossible to conceive of 
objects independent of our perceptions, they could not exist. He wrote 
that the opinion that objects exist “distinct from their being perceived 
by the understanding” involves “a manifest contradiction.”79 Hume 
agreed with this latter claim: He wrote that it is “impossible for us 
to form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and 
impressions”—that is, from our perceptions.80 However, this was not 
the end of the story for Hume.
75. Hume, Enquiry 12.15, n.32, p.112.
76. This is not to deny that Berkeley was seen as a skeptic during the Enlight-
enment. See Sébastien Charles, Berkeley au siècle des Lumières: immatérialisme et 
scepticisme au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 2003). See also Sébastien Charles’s contribution 
in this volume (p.89–108).
77. George Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge, in The 
Works of George Berkeley bishop of Cloyne, ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, 9 vols. 
(Edinburgh and London, 1948–1957), vol.2, part 1, sec.87, p.79. Subsequent 
references to the Principles give part, section, and page numbers.
78. Hume, Enquiry 12.15, n.32, p.112.
79. Berkeley, Principles 1.4, p.42.
80. Hume, Treatise 1.2.6.8, p.68.
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Hume’s aim in a long section of his Treatise of human nature entitled 
“Of scepticism with regard to the senses” was to explain the source 
of our natural belief in the existence of external objects. He began 
that section by announcing that the skeptic “must assent to the belief 
in body, tho’ he cannot pretend by any arguments of philosophy to 
maintain its veracity.”81 “Nature,” he wrote, “has not left this to his 
choice and has esteem’d it an affair of too great importance to be 
trusted to our uncertain reasonings and explanations.” By a “body” 
Hume meant an object which is “DISTINCT from the mind and 
perception”—that is, independent “of their existence and operation.”82 
For Hume, unlike for Berkeley, we cannot help but believe in the 
existence of bodies—except for a brief period, when we reflect on the 
irrationality of the formation of the belief.83
In Hume’s philosophy, clear and distinct ideas are all derived from 
impressions.84 But there is, according to Hume, no impression of 
bodies—that is, of objects that are external and independent.85 Philos-
ophers discover through a few simple experiments that our sensory 
impressions are mind-dependent and cannot exist unperceived.86 
It follows that we can have no legitimate idea of externality and 
independence. Hume’s argument for this conclusion, unlike that of 
Berkeley, is based on “experience and observation.”87 But the result, 
that we have no clear and distinct idea of body or external existence, 
is the same.
Hume’s skepticism manifests itself in the incomprehensibility of 
the belief in an external and independent object—in its basis in an 
obscure and confused idea.88 According to Hume’s main explanation, 
the belief in body is based in a natural confusion of qualitative identity 
with quantitative or numerical identity, a belief that results from the 
postulation of a “fiction” of the imagination.89 When I experience 
81. Hume, Treatise 1.4.2.1, p.187.
82. Hume, Treatise 1.4.2.2, p.188.
83. Hume, Treatise 1.4.2.57, p.218.
84. Hume, Treatise 1.1.1.1, p.1–7; Enquiry 2.
85. Hume, Treatise 1.4.2.7, p.190.
86. Hume, Treatise 1.4.2.45, p.210–11; compare Enquiry 12.9.
87. Hume, Treatise 1.4.2.10, p.191.
88. See my “Hume’s sceptical realism,” in The Oxford handbook of David Hume, ed. 
Paul Russell (Oxford, 2016), p.60–81, esp. 66–67.
89. Hume, Treatise 1.4.2.32–41, p.202–209. On these pages Hume presents his 
chief explanation of belief in an external world, based on what he calls the 
“constancy” of our perceptions.
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perceptions which are qualitatively similar but discontinuous (for 
example, when I look away for a few moments when observing an 
object such as “my bed and table, my books and papers”),90 my 
imagination fills in the gap and confuses the gappy observation with 
the observation of a continuous and unchanging perception.91 This 
commits me to the belief in an “object or perception” that exists while 
unperceived.92 Moreover, the memory of past experiences of the 
continuously observed object enlivens the “fiction” of the unperceived 
perception and makes me believe in its existence.93 For all of its being 
a “fiction” in Hume’s technical sense—that is, an idea taken to refer 
to another impression than the one from which it is derived—it still 
generates a genuine belief.94
Hume argues that even philosophers, who correct the mistaken 
judgment of common sense which attributes an external and 
independent existence to our sensory impressions themselves, still 
remain psychologically dependent on that judgment.95 Reason teaches 
philosophers that our actual sensory impressions are mind-dependent, 
and these impressions cannot exist independently from their being 
perceived. Thus far, the philosophers correct the judgment of common 
sense. However, they are so affected by that natural or common-
sense judgment, that they postulate an unperceived continuously 
existing object which is represented by our sensory impressions. Hume 
argues that this philosophical theory of a “double existence” of the 
objects of sense only arises because we first form the common-sense 
judgment that our very sensory impressions exist while unperceived. 
The result is that even this representative realist theory of philosophers 
is infected with the initial confused and incomprehensible judgment, 
which it corrects.96 Nevertheless, Hume concludes that, even after 
90. Hume, Treatise 1.4.2.18, p.195.
91. Hume, Treatise 1.4.2.32–41, p.202–209.
92. Hume, Treatise 1.4.2.31, p.202.
93. Hume, Treatise 1.4.2.42, p.209: “As this propensity arises from some lively 
impressions of the memory, it bestows a vivacity on that fiction.” Hume’s theory 
of belief in what is unobserved as involving the enlivening of an idea through its 
relation to an impression of sense or memory was originally set out in Treatise 
1.3.7–10, p.94–106.
94. See Hume, Treatise 1.2.3.11, p.37.
95. Hume, Treatise 1.4.2.46–55, p.211–17. On the logic of Hume’s argument see my 
Sceptical realism of David Hume, esp. p.55–59.
96. Moreover, philosophers have no independent way of proving through reason 
that our impressions are caused by and represent independent and distinct 
external objects because they have no access to the latter with which to compare 
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 contemplating all these difficulties in our belief in a world independent 
of our mind and senses, the philosopher will still be convinced that 
“there is both an external and an internal world” after he leaves his 
study.97
In reinterpreting Berkeley as a skeptic in his Enquiry, Hume focuses 
on Berkeley’s argument against the intelligibility or comprehensibility 
of the philosophical notion of matter. According to that notion, matter 
consists solely of primary qualities such as extension, shape, solidity, 
and motion, while secondary qualities such as color and hardness 
are purely subjective.98 Berkeley had argued that, since one cannot 
conceive of the primary qualities of bodies apart from the secondary 
ones, the primary qualities also must be purely mind-dependent.99 
Hume rehearses Berkeley’s argument in his Enquiry and, like him, 
claims that the philosophical notion of matter is rooted in the “unintel-
ligible, and even absurd” theory of abstraction. Nevertheless, at least in 
his earlier Treatise, Hume still held that this unintelligible supposition 
of a purely quantitative world apart from sensible qualities is “the 
fundamental principle” of modern science,100 and that it involves “a 
considerable advancement of the speculative sciences.”101
We saw in section i that Bayle argued in his article on Zeno of 
Elea for the incomprehensibility of extension (and matter) based the 
paradoxes of its composition. In addition, in remark G of that article 
he argued that primary qualities are no less relative to the perceiver 
than secondary ones—and hence, if their relativity proved that the 
latter were not objective or real, then the same conclusion must apply 
to the former.102 Admittedly, Bayle did not go so far as to argue for 
the incomprehensibility of a world of primary without secondary 
qualities, as did Berkeley and Hume. Nevertheless, his arguments 
them. See Hume, Enquiry 12.12, p.114–15; compare Hume, Treatise 1.4.2.14, 
p.193.
97. Hume, Treatise 1.4.2.57, p.218.
98. Hume, Enquiry 12.15, p.115–16; compare Treatise 1.5, p.225–31.
99. Berkeley, Principles 1.10, p.45.
100. Hume, Treatise 1.4.4.3, p.226.
101. Hume, Treatise 3.1.26, p.469. In his later Enquiry, Hume seems less certain of 
this basic principle of the mechanical philosophy that goes back to Galileo. In 
his later Enquiry, he writes that Berkeley’s argument shows that the principle 
is “contrary to reason; at least, if it be a principle of reason that all sensible 
qualities are in the mind, not in the object” (Enquiry 12.16, p.116).
102. Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. “Zenon d’Elée,” rem. G, vol.4, p.541a; compare the 
objection of the philosophical abbé at art. “Pyrrhon,” rem. B, vol.4, p.732a–b.
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against the three alternative accounts of the composition of extension 
went as far as their arguments in showing the incomprehensibility of 
the real and objective existence of matter. So, there is good reason 
to question Hume’s judgment that Berkeley’s arguments form better 
lessons of skepticism than those of Bayle. Both philosophers show the 
incomprehensibility of extension or matter when subjected to rational 
arguments and yet, as Hume himself acknowledges, these arguments 
“have little or no influence on practice.”103
v. Hume on the incomprehensibility of causal relations
Hume’s most important philosophical innovation is to be found in 
his account of the belief in causal relations. This has both a negative 
and a positive side. On the negative side, he argues that “the force 
or energy” or power by which one object causes another “is entirely 
incomprehensible” to us.104 He identifies this force, energy, and power 
of the cause with the necessary connection between the cause and 
effect, and argues negatively that this connection is never perceived.105 
However, he also argues positively that we believe in such a connection 
on the basis of a supposition we make when we experience one kind of 
event always followed by another: “When one particular species of 
event has always, in all instances been conjoined with another […] we 
then call the one object, Cause; the other Effect. We suppose, that there 
is some power in the one, by which it infallibly produces the other, and 
operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity.”106 The 
constant experience of effects following their causes produces a belief 
in their necessary connection, and a supposition that there is power in 
the cause which produces the effect.
Hume stresses that, even after constant experience, the connection 
of causes and their effects is incomprehensible to us. This applies to 
causes in the mind itself, as well as in the physical world. He writes in 
his Treatise that “the uniting principle, among our internal perceptions 
is as unintelligible as that among external objects.”107 Experience 
103. Hume, Treatise 3.1.1.26, p.469.
104. Hume, Enquiry 7.25, p.57 (emphasis added).
105. On the equivalency of these terms, see Hume, Enquiry 7.5, p.50, and Treatise 
1.3.14.4, p.4.
106. Hume, Enquiry 7.27, p.59. In his Treatise Hume allowed that we can suppose what 
we are unable to conceive (Hume, Treatise 1.4.5.20, p.241; compare 1.4.6.9, p.68). 
See my Hume’s “A Treatise of human nature”: an introduction, p.59–60.
107. Hume, Treatise 1.3.14.29, p.169.
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never gives us “any insight into the internal structure or operating 
principle of objects.” It “only teaches us, how one event constantly 
follows another; without instructing us in the secret connexion, which 
binds them together, and renders them inseparable.”108 Our natural 
supposition that there is a power in the cause that produces the effect 
is due to the principle of human nature, which he calls custom or 
habit: The “customary transition of the imagination from one object 
to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression, from which we 
form the idea of power or necessary connexion.”109 In his Treatise, 
Hume further accounts for this belief in objective power by arguing 
that we project the subjective feeling of necessity generated by repeated 
instances on to the objects themselves.110
The incomprehensibility of causal relations is ascertained by philos-
ophers when they analyze the ideas of cause and effect. Hume’s central 
argument is that our perceptions of cause and effect are always found 
to be distinct and can be conceived independently. When philosophers 
examine the ideas we have of causes and their effects, they discover 
that they can always conceive of the existence of the one without the 
other—something that would be impossible if they could comprehend 
the power by which one produces the other. In his Treatise, Hume writes 
that since “the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, it will be 
easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment and 
existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or 
productive principle.”111 From the distinction of our impressions and 
ideas of cause and effect he concludes that the power of the cause, or 
its necessary connection with its effect, is incomprehensible.
Nevertheless, in common life, under the influence of custom and 
habit, both ordinary people and philosophers suppose the existence 
of causal power in the objects of the senses, and so draw inferences 
from constantly observed causes to their accompanying effects. Hume 
writes that, “notwithstanding this ignorance of natural powers and 
principles, we always presume, when we see like sensible qualities, that 
they have like secret powers, and expect, that effects, similar to those 
which we have experienced, will follow from them.”112 Hume holds 
that we do not merely draw an inference from cause to effect on the 
108. Hume, Enquiry 7.13, p.53.
109. Hume, Enquiry 7.28, p.59; compare Enquiry 5.5, p.37.
110. Hume, Treatise 1.3.14.25, p.167.
111. Hume, Treatise 1.3.3.3, p.79–80; compare Hume, Enquiry 4.11–12, p.27.
112. Hume, Enquiry 4.16, p.29 (emphasis added).
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basis of constant experience, but we do so under the assumption of an 
underlying causal power.
How then does Hume account for the fact that we never comprehend 
the causal power between causes and their effects? His answer is that 
we have imperfect, inadequate, or deficient ideas of cause and effect in 
both matter and mind. For example, in his Enquiry he writes that “So 
imperfect are the ideas” of the relation of cause and effect that we can 
only define it from “something extraneous and foreign to it.”113
The difference between philosophers and unreflective persons is 
that the former attribute the power to the unknown cause represented by 
our perceptions, not to the perceptions themselves. When philosophers 
discover irregularities in our experience, they are so fully convinced 
of the existence of the underlying unintelligible causal power, that 
they “form a maxim, that the connexion of all causes and effects is 
equally necessary, [and] that its seeming uncertainty in some instances 
proceeds from the secret operation of contrary causes.”114
It is striking that in his discussions of causation Hume provides us 
with a clear and distinct criterion for what would count as knowledge 
and comprehension of causal power, while at the same time denying 
that we ever attain such comprehension. He writes that if we could 
comprehend the relation between cause and effect, our inferences 
from one to the other “would amount to knowledge, and would imply 
the absolute contradiction and impossibility of conceiving any thing 
different.”115 We would be able to “penetrate into their essences” and 
“discover the dependence of the one upon the other.” The fact that 
this is never the case shows that our belief in causation is incompre-
hensible—particularly after he has shown in a positive way the 
generation of that belief through “an illusion of the imagination.”116
Hume also applies his account of causation to the problem of 
the relation of the mind and body. He employs it to critique the 
philosophical claim that, since it is incomprehensible how physical 
changes in the body can cause changes in the thoughts of the mind, 
such causation can never take place. At the end of the Treatise section 
113. Hume, Enquiry 7.29, p.60. For an explanation of how the definitions that Hume 
goes on to provide are “extraneous and foreign” to what is defined, see my 
Hume’s “A Treatise of human nature”: an introduction, p.118–20. At Treatise 1.3.14.10, 
p.160, he claims that we have “no adequate idea of power in any object,” and at 
1.4.7.6, p.267, he writes of the “deficiency” of our ideas of cause and effect.
114. Hume, Treatise 1.3.12.5, p.132; Enquiry 8.13, p.66.
115. Hume, Treatise 1.3.6.1, p.86.
116. Hume, Treatise 1.4.7.6, p.267.
155Skepticism and incomprehensibility in Bayle and Hume
“Of the immateriality of the soul,” that we discussed in section ii, 
he considers the argument that, since changes in our physical bodies 
have no resemblance to our mental perceptions, they cannot cause 
them: “Matter and motion […] however vary’d […] produce only 
a difference in the position and situation of objects […] ’Tis absurd 
to imagine […] that the shocking of two globular particles shou’d 
become a sensation of pain, and that the meeting of two triangular 
particles shou’d afford a pleasure.”117 The conclusion of this argument 
is that it is “impossible, that thought can ever be caus’d by matter.” 
Hume replies to this argument by pointing out that in no case do we 
comprehend how causes produce their effects—neither in the physical 
nor in the mental world. Resemblance between cause and effect does 
not make causation any more comprehensible.118 Before observing 
constant regularity in experience, “any thing may produce any thing, 
and we shall never discover the reason why any object may or may 
not be the cause of any other, however great, or however little the 
resemblance may be.”119
Then Hume poses a dilemma: either to deny that anything can 
really cause anything else except when we can perceive the connection, 
or “to maintain, that all objects, which we find constantly conjoin’d, 
are upon that account to be regarded as causes and effects.”120 He 
rejects the first horn of the dilemma, on the ground that since we never 
comprehend the connection between any cause and its effect we would 
then have to draw the absurd conclusion that there is no power or 
production anywhere in or outside the universe, even in God or the 
first being.121 In arguing for the second horn, he concludes on the basis 
of their constant conjunction that “matter and motion may often be 
regarded as the causes of thought, as far as we have any notion of that 
relation.”122 The regular conjunction of physical changes in our bodies 
with changes in our mental state gives evidence that the former cause 
the latter. Indeed, Hume goes so far as to claim that our experience 
117. Hume, Treatise 1.4.5.29, p.246.
118. Hume, Treatise 1.3.9.10, p.111–12.
119. Hume, Treatise 1.4.5.30, p.247.
120. Hume, Treatise 1.4.5.31, p.248.
121. Hume, Treatise 1.4.5.31, p.248–49. Compare Hume’s argument against the 
occasionalist claim that there is no power anywhere in the universe at Treatise 
1.3.14.8–10, p.159–60. In both cases he refers to the writings of Malebranche. 
For an analysis of Hume’s argument against Malebranche’s theory of causation, 
see my Sceptical realism of David Hume, p.136–45.
122. Hume, Treatise 1.4.5.32–34, p.250.
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of the constant conjunction “evidently gives the advantage to the 
materialists above their antagonists.”
This is the final solution to the antinomy of reason which Hume 
sets up earlier in his discussion “Of the immateriality of the soul” 
(discussed in section ii above). In spite of the incomprehensibility 
of both materialism and immaterialism, we have evidence through 
experience and our natural belief-forming mechanisms that changes 
in our physical state cause changes in our mental state.
vi. Incomprehensibility in Hume and Bayle  
on the design argument
The incomprehensibility of the supreme being is a central topic in 
Hume’s posthumously published Dialogues concerning natural religion (1779). 
It is stressed not only by his theist Demea, who defends Samuel Clarke’s 
version of the cosmological argument, but also by his skeptic Philo. 
According to Demea, when we apply the terms “thought” or “reason” 
“to the supreme being” we must acknowledge that “their meaning 
[…] is totally incomprehensible.”123 Thought and reasoning in finite 
creatures, being essentially successive and compounded, are incompre-
hensible when applied to the divine being, who is eternal, unchanging, 
and an absolute unity. Cleanthes, by contrast, the character who 
defends the eighteenth-century argument from design, questions how 
Demea’s view of “the absolute incomprehensibility of the deity” differs 
from that of “sceptics or atheists, who assert, that the first cause of all 
is unknown and unintelligible.”124 Cleanthes’s own argument bases the 
belief in an intelligent creator on the order and apparent purposefulness 
of nature.125 He argues on the basis of experience that such a creator 
must reason and plan with a mind not unlike that of human beings. 
The other two interlocutors accuse him of anthropomorphism, while 
he in turn accuses them of mysticism—that is the complete incompre-
hensibility of the divine nature. In the final dialogue, after Demea has 
left the scene, Philo argues that the dispute between the atheist and 
philosophical theist is “merely verbal” or “incurably ambiguous.”126 
123. David Hume, Dialogues concerning natural religion, ed. Dorothy Coleman 
(Cambridge, 2007), part 3, para.13, p.34. Subsequent references to the Dialogues 
are to this edition, and give part, paragraph, and page numbers.
124. Hume, Dialogues 4.1, p.35.
125. See especially Dialogues 2.5, 2.14, 2.16, p.19–20, 22–23.
126. Hume, Dialogues 12.7, p.92–94. This long paragraph was added in 1776, a few 
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The theist must allow “that there is a great and immeasurable, because 
incomprehensible difference between the human and the divine mind.”127 
The atheist, in turn, must allow that “the principle which first arranged, 
and still maintains the universe bears […] some remote inconceivable 
analogy, to […] human mind and thought.” However, having made 
this concession, Philo goes on to argue in effect that there is no likeness 
between the moral values of human beings and those of their creator.128 
The universe appears entirely destitute of anything like human moral 
values. The incomprehensibility of human moral qualities as applied to the 
Deity—foreshadowed in Bayle’s discussions of Manicheanism in the 
Dictionary—means that a consistent rational religion (i.e., deism) has no 
implications for human behavior.129
In Hume’s Dialogues, Philo takes issue with Bayle’s argument against 
the claim that the first principle of the universe can be material, an 
argument based on its incomprehensibility. Among some manuscript 
notes from Hume’s reading which have survived, we find the following:
Strato’s Atheism the most dangerous of the Ancient, holding the 
Origin of the World from Nature, or a Matter endu’d with Activity. 
Baile [sic] thinks there are none but the Cartesians can refute this 
Atheism.
A Stratonician cou’d retort the Arguments of all the Sects of 
Philosophy… The same question, Why the Parts or Ideas of God had 
that particular Arrangement? is as difficult as why the World had.130
Hume’s remarks relate particularly to sections 106 and 111 of Bayle’s 
Continuation des Pensées diverses; the latter was entitled “That it is 
months before Hume’s death and, according to M. A. Stewart, “takes on a 
special significance as his dying testament to posterity.” See M. A. Stewart, 
“The dating of Hume’s manuscripts,” in The Scottish Enlightenment: essays in reinter-
pretation, ed. Paul Wood (Rochester, NY, 2000), p.267–314 (303).
127. Emphasis added.
128. Hume, Dialogues 11.14, p.86.
129. Hume, Dialogues 12.33, p.101–102.
130. See Ernest C. Mossner, “Hume’s early memoranda, 1729–1740,” Journal of 
the history of ideas 9 (1948), p.492–518 (501). In spite of Mossner’s title, the best 
evidence shows that these notes, which are in different inks, were written 
at different periods throughout the 1740s after Hume published his Treatise 
(1739–1740); see Stewart, “The dating of Hume’s manuscripts,” p.276–88. For a 
more complete discussion of Hume’s use of the note on Stratonician atheism, its 
relevance to his thoughts on active matter and occasionalism, and its incorpo-
ration into the Dialogues, see my Sceptical realism of David Hume, p.167–74.
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important to teach that matter is destitute of activity.”131 Bayle had 
argued in section 106 that atheists, who followed the ancient Aristo-
telian philosopher Strato, could provide a strong response to the 
argument from design: “they could retort with greater force against 
their antagonists” than other forms of atheism.132 For Strato had held 
that the order which is to be found in matter always existed, and that 
the universe is eternal. Thus, a Stratonician could dispense with the 
need for a divine mind to explain the origin of the order found in 
nature. Indeed, Bayle argued that even those modern philosophers 
who maintain that physical causes, such as impulse, are “second 
causes,” and that God is only required for their conservation, could 
not answer the Stratonicians.133 Once these modern philosophers 
admit that there are natural causes which act without knowledge, they 
dispense with the need for a divine mind. Bayle wrote: “If this order 
once exists without knowledge, it lasts eternally: the most difficult 
thing is already done.”134
Bayle went on to argue that Stratonician atheism can only be 
countered by a Cartesian occasionalism which maintains that it is 
incomprehensible that any cause can act without an understanding of 
the effect and of the means by which it is produced.135 Thus, even the 
order that according to Strato existed in nature eternally, would have 
to be produced by a divine mind that understands the order that it 
creates.
In the Dialogues, Hume takes up the claim in his manuscript cited 
above that, in answering Bayle, the Stratonician could reply by asking 
“the same question” of the divine mind: What is the cause of the order 
found in it? Philo states that “it is not easy, to see, what is gained by 
[… the] supposition” that the order in the world is derived from such a 
mind.136 For the order found in “a mental world, or universe of ideas, 
131. Pierre Bayle, Continuation des Pensées diverses, in Œuvres diverses, 4 vols. (The Hague, 
Compagnie des libraires, 1737), vol.3, p.340a.
132. Bayle, Continuation des Pensées diverses, sec.106, p.333a.
133. Bayle, Continuation des Pensées diverses, p.340b–341a.
134. Bayle, Continuation des Pensées diverses, p.336a.
135. Bayle wrote that “the incomprehensibility that one can object to Strato forms an 
insoluble argument and an insurmountable difficulty” (Continuation des Pensées 
diverses, sec.111, p.341b, emphasis added). This rationalist argument against the 
Stratonicians, which can be traced to the writings of Malebranche, is explained 
at length in Todd Ryan, Pierre Bayle’s Cartesian metaphysics (New York, 2009), esp. 
p.71–73 and 150–51, 156–57 and passim.
136. Hume, Dialogues 4.6, p.37.
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requires a cause as much, as does a material world […]; and, if similar 
in its arrangement, must require a similar cause.”137 Bayle’s claim 
that any order requires an ordered intelligent mind would lead to 
the absurd conclusion that there are an infinite number of intelligent 
divine minds, each one causing the order of the next. By contrast, if 
we look to experience we find that the order of ideas in our minds, the 
only intelligent minds with which we are directly acquainted, depends 
on material causes: “A difference of age, of the disposition of his body, 
of weather, of food, of company, of books, of passions; any of these 
particulars and others more minute, are sufficient to alter the curious 
machinery of thought, and communicate to it very different movements 
and operations.”138 In this way, Hume employs his own naturalistic 
account of causation to counter Bayle’s occasionalist argument that 
it is incomprehensible that anything besides a knowing mind can 
produce the order we discover in the physical world. The connection 
between any cause and its effect is absolutely incomprehensible, and 
we can only determine what causes what through regular experience.
vii. Conclusion
I have argued that skepticism in the philosophies of both Bayle and 
Hume is characterized by the claim that in many cases we must 
believe what is incomprehensible. However, it may be objected that 
“incomprehensibility” and related terms such as “inconceivable,” 
“unintelligible,” “absurd,” “contradictory,” which these philosophers 
ascribe to our beliefs, do not have precise enough meanings to charac-
terize eighteenth-century skepticism. I am honestly not sure how to 
deal with this objection in a general way. I do hope nevertheless to 
have shown in a variety of cases that skepticism as conceived by these 
philosophers involves an assertion concerning the incomprehensibility 
of our beliefs—without leading to their rejection. Hume wrote that 
“the sceptical doubt […] always increases, the further we carry on 
our reflections […] Carelessness and in-attention alone can afford 
us a remedy.”139 The same may be said of our attempts to precisely 
define skepticism itself. Perhaps all we can then do is to go through 
the individual cases in which Bayle and Hume argue that beliefs are 
incomprehensible and follow each path they take to that conclusion, 
137. Hume, Dialogues 4.7, p.37.
138. Hume, Dialogues 4.8, p.38.
139. Hume, Treatise 1.4.2.57, p.218.
160 John P. Wright
whether it be laying out an antinomy of reason, the inconceivability 
of contrary accounts of the nature of reality, the opposing views of 
reason and the senses, the contradictions involved in the generation 
of natural beliefs themselves, or, finally, the opposition between the 
distinct impressions that we experience as cause and effect, and the 
necessary causal powers that we naturally ascribe to their objects on 
the basis of that experience.
